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SOLVING SOME DUE PROCESS PUZZLES: 
A RESPONSE TO JEROLD ISRAEL 
CAROL S. STEIKER* 
It is a pleasure to be taken on Professor Jerold Israel’s thorough and 
comprehensive tour of the Supreme Court’s due process cases relating to 
criminal procedure.  His careful doctrinal history maps out an entire city that 
most of us—even we professors of criminal procedure—know only 
neighborhood by neighborhood, and in which we tend to recognize only the 
more recent signposts and landmarks.  Professor Israel offers a map, an 
annotated guidebook and an era-by-era history that resembles one of those 
layered archeology exhibits found at natural history museums.  It is a 
tremendously helpful compendium that will be required reading for all serious 
students of constitutional criminal procedure. 
On the other hand, it is not an easy piece for which to formulate a 
response.  Professor Israel explicitly invites contributions of two kinds.  First, 
he acknowledges that his is a doctrinal history that necessarily ignores “the 
personalities and the political and societal developments”1 that contributed to 
shaping the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.  “Hopefully,” says 
Professor Israel, “others will fill in the rest of the picture.”2  Second, Professor 
Israel maps out a variety of possible positions on the relationship of due 
process to criminal procedure to which the Supreme Court might yet commit, 
but he leaves “evaluating the wisdom of these different positions”3 to his 
commentators, of whom I am one.  I hate to disappoint, but I am afraid that 
neither task is one that I undertake in this response, at least not wholly or 
directly.  I decline the invitation to provide biographical, political or social 
history primarily because of limited expertise and time (the same excuse 
pleaded by Professor Israel himself), but I decline the invitation to defend a 
coherent normative vision of the intersection of due process and criminal 
procedure primarily because of a certain skepticism I feel toward that project.  
The enormously wide-ranging influence of the due process clause over the 
entire area of constitutional criminal procedure demonstrated by Professor 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Harvard Law School. 
 1. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 306 (2001). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 426. 
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Israel’s work resists any simple, over-arching normative framework.  Although 
I do not share the radical rejection of “top-down” theory propounded by some 
of my colleagues,4 I do partake of a more limited reluctance to search for a 
single paradigm or even a single set of guidelines that must cover so much 
diverse territory. 
However, I will try to offer in this brief response some comments that 
might be deemed at least slightly (albeit quite imperfectly) responsive to 
Professor Israel’s call for historical context and normative constitutionalism.  I 
will describe some due process puzzles I have encountered in my teaching of 
various aspects of constitutional criminal procedure and explain how Professor 
Israel’s work has helped me to make sense of them.  By using Professor 
Israel’s work to help explain these puzzling cases, I hope to further enrich the 
context he has already provided.  In addition, while I do not offer the 
normative guidelines that Professor Israel invites, his piece and my puzzles do 
lead me to some normative reflections—about what Professor Israel politely 
calls “craft,”5 but which I might call candor or transparency. 
Of course, both of my puzzles make brief appearances—how could they 
not?—in Professor Israel’s encyclopedic work.  However, I will play them out 
in a bit more detail and then explain how Professor Israel’s work has given me 
some new insight into them. 
The first puzzle is one I encounter every time I teach what those in the 
criminal procedure “biz” know as the “bail to jail” course—the chronological 
overview of issues, primarily constitutional, relating to criminal adjudication.  
Very early in this course, I teach the famous case of Gerstein v. Pugh,6 in 
which the Supreme Court held that arresting and holding an unindicted person 
for trial was unconstitutional without a judicial determination of probable 
cause for detention.  While this is a landmark case in that it delineated a new 
right for criminal defendants, the Supreme Court actually cut back on the 
holding below of the Fifth Circuit, which had not only invalidated Florida’s 
practice of detaining people for trial on nothing but a prosecutor’s information, 
but also required that the judicial hearing on probable cause be an adversary 
one.7  The Supreme Court decided that what are now known as “Gerstein 
hearings” need not be adversarial; rather, they can be ex parte and based on 
sworn rather than live testimony.8  The Court reached this conclusion by 
asserting that the Fourth Amendment warrant process specifies the “process 
that is due” in criminal cases involving seizures and detentions of persons.  
 
 4. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
 5. Israel, supra note 1, at 426. 
 6. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 7. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119. 
 8. Id. at 125. 
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Thus, those arrested on a judicial warrant are not entitled to Gerstein hearings, 
and those arrested without warrants are entitled only to the same sort of 
hearing that would generate such warrants.  This particular determination of 
the Court was a close one, 5-to-4, with Justice Stewart penning a blistering 
attack on the majority’s reasoning: 
I see no need in this case for the Court to say that the Constitution extends less 
procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to test the 
propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account, the custody of a 
refrigerator, the temporary suspension of a public school student, or the 
suspension of a driver’s license.  Although it may be true that the Fourth 
Amendment’s “balance between individual and public interests always has 
been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or 
property in criminal cases,” this case does not involve an initial arrest, but 
rather the continuing incarceration of a presumptively innocent person.  
Accordingly, I cannot join the Court’s effort to foreclose any claim that the 
traditional requirements of constitutional due process are applicable in the 
context of pretrial detention.9 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, responded to Stewart’s call for 
“traditional” due process analysis not by denying that such analysis might lead 
to a different result, but rather by insisting that the due process clause was 
simply inapposite to the case because the Fourth Amendment was “tailored 
explicitly”10 for the criminal justice system.11  Powell thus suggested—but did 
not elaborate or defend—the proposition that if there is a specific constitutional 
provision on point (as there often will be in the post-incorporation world, given 
the relative specificity of the Bill of Rights regarding criminal procedure), 
there is no recourse to the due process clause, even if there is a strong 
argument that traditional due process balancing would lead to a different result. 
Students in my class enjoy elaborating and taking sides in this debate 
between Stewart and Powell, but they really start scratching their heads when, 
much later in my chronological course (and twelve years later in Supreme 
Court time), we stumble upon Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,12 in which a father 
accused of raping his daughter sought to subpoena confidential files containing 
prior statements made by the complainant to the state Children and Youth 
Services in the course of its investigation of the complaint of sexual abuse.  
Once again, the Supreme Court announced a new right for criminal 
defendants—the right to have access to any information deemed material to the 
defense by the court after in camera review of the relevant records.13  But once 
again, the Court rejected the broader reasoning and result of the lower court, in 
 
 9. Id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations and internal references omitted). 
 10. Id. at 125 n.27. 
 11. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125. 
 12. 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
 13. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43. 
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this case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which would have granted the 
defendant direct access to the subpoenaed material based on a reading of the 
compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment, which gives a defendant 
the right to use the “compulsory process” of the courts—the subpoena power—
for “obtaining witnesses in his favor.”14  Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reasoned that the defendant’s claim should be considered not under the 
compulsory process clause but rather under the “broader protections of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”15 because that is what the Court 
“traditionally”16 had done in prior cases involving the government’s duty to 
disclose material exculpatory evidence. 
Therein, of course, lies the source of the head scratching.  Why was the 
Fourth Amendment deemed to be “tailored explicitly” for the criminal process, 
when it nowhere mentions criminal cases, while the Sixth Amendment was not 
so deemed, despite the fact that it begins with the words, “In all criminal 
cases . . .”?  Why did Ritchie get the benefit of the “broader protections” of the 
due process clause, while Pugh and his co-respondents did not?  Why did the 
Ritchie Court not mention Gerstein?  What, if anything, changed in the twelve 
years between Gerstein and Ritchie?  And which opinion is right, anyway? 
The second puzzle is one that I encounter whenever I teach my course on 
capital punishment.  In 1971, the Supreme Court considered the first global 
constitutional challenge to the practice of capital punishment.  The capital 
defendants in McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio17 both argued 
that their death sentences were unconstitutionally imposed because their 
sentencing juries deliberated without any standards to guide the exercise of 
their discretion.  As the Court described their argument: “[P]etitioners contend 
that to leave the jury completely at large to impose or withhold the death 
penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally lawless and therefore violates the basic 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deprive a person of 
his life without due process of law.”18  Despite the “undeniable surface 
appeal”19 of this argument, the Court rejected it, explaining that providing 
appropriate guidance to capital sentencing juries is both impossible (because 
any list of determinative factors would be both over- and under-inclusive) and 
unnecessary (because capital sentencing jurors can be counted on to take their 
job very seriously and thus to consider all factors relevant to a given case). 
Just one year later, however, the Supreme Court considered exactly the 
same challenge to prevailing capital sentencing practices—this time, however, 
 
 14. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 15. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 18. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196. 
 19. Id. 
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under the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” rather than under the due process clause.  And this time, of 
course, the capital defendants prevailed.  The famous case of Furman v. 
Georgia,20 which had the effect of constitutionally invalidating death penalty 
statutes nationwide, generated no precise holding, because each of the five 
Justices in the majority issued his own opinion, with none of them joining the 
opinion of any of the others.  However, one predominant theme in the majority 
opinions was the unacceptability of standardless discretion.  In the evocative 
words of Justice Stewart, such standardless sentencing regimes generate death 
sentences that are “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual.”21 
What I and my students always find baffling here is the fact that the Court 
chose to invalidate standardless capital sentencing under the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause rather than the due process clause, when the argument 
sounds so—well, procedural.  Indeed, the whole “death is different” theme 
that runs through Furman and much of the rest of the Court’s capital 
jurisprudence seems like a natural argument for the sliding scale of due 
process—the more significant the individual interest, the greater the process 
that is due.  The students always assume that there must have been a change in 
the Court’s personnel between McGautha and Furman, and that the altered 
Court was simply looking for a way to abolish capital punishment without 
running afoul of the doctrine of stare decisis.  It is true that two members of 
the Court changed between McGautha and Furman: Justices Black and Harlan 
left the Court and were replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, 
respectively.  But Powell and Rehnquist voted in Furman exactly as Black and 
Harlan had done in McGautha—to uphold capital punishment against 
constitutional challenge.  It was Justices Stewart and White who changed their 
vote in the year between McGautha and Furman.  The puzzle is why?  Why 
was the cruel and unusual punishments clause a more attractive route to the 
(temporary) abolition of capital punishment, when doctrinally it seems like so 
much more of a stretch? 
I must admit, our collective head scratching never yielded any very 
insightful conclusions.  The cynics among the students tended to resolve the 
apparent conflict between Gerstein and Ritchie by positing that the Court’s 
choice between the due process clause and a more specific provision of the Bill 
of Rights was governed simply by the Court’s desire to limit the scope of 
criminal defendants’ rights.  And the change from McGautha to Furman can 
be accounted for by Justice White’s theory that the infrequency with which 
capital punishment was imposed prevented it from furthering any plausible 
 
 20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 21. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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penological purpose and thus rendered it “excessive”22—an argument that does 
sound more appropriate to the cruel and unusual punishments clause than the 
due process clause.  Given that White (along with Stewart) was one of the two 
crucial changed votes, his theory might be enough to explain the apparently 
puzzling choice of constitutional rubrics. 
Professor Israel’s detailed work on the evolution of the relationship 
between due process and criminal procedure suggests some more plausible and 
richer solutions to my puzzles.  First of all, Professor Israel convincingly 
demonstrates that the Gerstein/Ritchie conflict is only part of a larger ebb and 
flow on this very issue.  He adds Graham v. Connor23 on the Gerstein side and 
Chambers v. Mississippi24 and Ake v. Oklahoma25 on the Ritchie side, as well 
as Albright v. Oliver26 and County of Sacramento v. Lewis27 as limiting the 
Graham/Gerstein principle.  This elaboration adds more than doctrinal 
thoroughness to the issue; it demonstrates that the relationship between the due 
process clause and the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights was a 
frequently encountered issue with a long and conflicted history, stretching 
back, indeed, to the foundational case of Hurtado v. California.28  While 
Professor Israel does not generally attempt himself to imagine or attribute 
reasons for this ebb and flow beyond the reasons given within the Court’s 
cases, his careful elaboration and analysis of those reasons provide fodder for 
such speculation, and I will thus try to tease out some solutions to my puzzles 
from his work. 
First, the very organization of Professor Israel’s account, which separates 
pre-incorporation and post-incorporation due process cases, recognizes that the 
Court had good reasons to view free-standing due process very differently in 
the post-incorporation context.  Most significantly, as Professor Israel 
recognizes, while in the pre-incorporation era, free-standing due process could 
cut both ways (i.e., it enabled the Court “not only to recognize rights that had 
not been recognized at common law, but also to conclude that certain rights 
recognized in the common law tradition were no longer deemed basic to 
fairness”29), in the post-incorporation era, free-standing due process became a 
one-way ratchet (“the flexible, open-ended due process could grow in only one 
direction—adding to the rights protected under the Bill of Rights”30).  
Moreover, as Professor Israel also recognizes, selective incorporation 
 
 22. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring). 
 23. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 24. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 25. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 26. 510 U.S. 266 (1994). 
 27. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 28. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 29. Israel, supra note 1, at 387. 
 30. Id.  
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happened tremendously quickly, with all but one of the criminal procedure 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights applied to the states “over a period of less than 
a decade.”31  The Court paid a large price in public legitimacy for its so-called 
“criminal procedure revolution.”  Indeed, a large part of President Nixon’s 
platform in 1968 was based on “law and order” concerns and included explicit 
promises to appoint Justices to the Court who would share his views on this 
important issue.  Very soon after the era of incorporation, the Court also made 
another withdrawal from its legitimacy bank,32 when it decided Roe v. Wade,33 
a decision based in part on a broad reading of the due process clause.  Thus, it 
is not at all surprising that the pressure to cabin the use of the due process 
clause would be exceedingly strong in 1975, the year in which Gerstein was 
decided. 
Moreover, the Court’s speedy incorporation of the criminal procedure 
protections of the Bill of Rights had already imposed huge costs in terms of 
reorganization and litigation in the state courts.  The imposition of yet another 
expensive and time-consuming protection—the adversary hearing rejected in 
Gerstein—would have imposed a cost far beyond the civil due process 
hearings that the Court had approved for the repossession of refrigerators and 
the suspension of public school students to which Justice Stewart referred in 
his sharply worded concurrence.  The criminal justice system was simply much 
bigger and more continuously in operation than any civil setting, and in 
addition, it required the free provision of lawyers to participate in any 
adversary hearing that might be required.34  Thus, there were tremendously 
strong pressures to decide Gerstein the way it came out in 1975. 
Twelve years later, however, when the Court was faced with the Ritchie 
case, the situation had in some ways shifted: despite the Gerstein Court’s 
attempt to cabin the use of free-standing due process, that doctrine had already 
left its mark all over the trial process, and far beyond merely those rights aimed 
at providing a fair hearing, as Professor Israel amply documents.  In contrast, it 
was the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights that in many instances 
had not yet been broadly construed beyond the narrow trial context.  The 
compulsory process clause at issue in Ritchie was a case in point: as the 
majority opinion noted, “This Court has had little occasion to discuss the 
contours of the compulsory process clause.”35  Ritchie provided an opportunity 
to cabin the compulsory process clause in a way that the Court had earlier tried 
 
 31. Id. at 304. 
 32. See Stanley Ingber, The Interference of Myth and Practice in Law, 34 VAND. L. REV. 
309, 339-40 (1981) (positing a “legitimacy account” from which the Supreme Court draws). 
 33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 34. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 35. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 55. 
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and failed to cabin the idea of procedural due process—by limiting its 
operation to ensuring the basic fairness of the trial, or the “main event.” 
As for the McGautha/Furman puzzle, those two cases were decided in 
1971 and 1972 respectively—immediately after the setting of the incorporation 
sun.  As with Gerstein, the hydraulic pressure to attempt some cabining of 
expansive procedural due process must have been at its apogee in the years 
immediately after the heyday of the criminal procedure revolution and the 
retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren.  Moreover, the epic tone and length of 
the opinions in Furman (and to a lesser extent, McGautha) signaled that the 
Court understood just how highly scrutinized and hotly contested its decisions 
in those cases were likely to be.  Only later, and in cases in which the stakes 
were much less high, did the Court employ the due process clause to regulate, 
in relatively minor ways,36 capital punishment practices under the 
Constitution.37 
Thus, Professor Israel’s careful, chronological presentation of the twists 
and turns of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence in relation to 
criminal procedure has generated some less reductionist and more plausible 
solutions to the puzzles I have encountered over and over again in my courses.  
Instead of simply shrugging our shoulders and writing off the Court as 
hopelessly outcome oriented, Professor Israel’s work lets us see how the due 
process clause might look different, and more or less attractive as the site of 
free-standing constitutional law-making, at different times and in different 
doctrinal contexts. 
But before we entirely reject a reductionist, cynical view of Supreme Court 
decision-making,38 let us consider what, if anything, the long and complicated 
doctrinal story related by Professor Israel suggests as a normative manner.  
Once again, I will not take on the task of proposing a coherent set of 
considerations to guide the Court in future due process decisions, despite 
Professor Israel’s invitation.  Rather, I prefer to draw out and reinforce a 
different sort of normative conclusion from Professor Israel’s work, a 
conclusion more about judicial attitude toward constitutional decision-making 
than about a particular doctrinal theory. 
The complete about-face between Gerstein and Ritchie (or, to a lesser 
extent, between McGautha and Furman) is unsettling partly, at least, because it 
 
 36. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 401 (1995) 
(describing the contribution of the due process clause to the constitutional regulation of capital 
punishment as “nothing more than a modest, ad hoc series of limitations on particular state 
practices” resulting in “quite marginal” constraints). 
 37. See Israel, supra note 1 at 394 n.533 (citing due process cases regarding capital 
punishment). 
 38. Such a view is more attractive than ever before, after the Court’s amazing and 
indefensible performance in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000). 
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is so unexplained.  Professor Israel observes that such “unacknowledged 
departures”39 are endemic in the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence, 
and he gently chides the Court for its failings in the area of “judicial ‘craft.’”  
Professor Israel, however, goes on to proffer a face-saving explanation for 
these failings: 
The implication of such silence is that the Court simply did not attach any 
precedential weight to its general descriptions of the character of due process. 
The rulings in the earlier cases, including what was said there about the 
particular procedural rights at issue, was not contrary to what the Court was 
now saying about different procedural rights.40 
Professor Israel intimates that he does not completely buy this theory, 
describing its implicit underlying distinction between “reasons” for a given 
ruling and a complete “explanation” of the ruling as challengeable as 
“inconsistent . . . with the purposes underlying the basic requirement that an 
appellate court offer reasons for its ruling.”41  He thus goes on to suggest that it 
would be “refreshing” and “perhaps even helpful” if the Court would someday 
“surprise us” with an opinion generating guidelines that it will announce and 
follow, albeit without the weight of stare decisis, in the due process area.42 
I would go a large step further than this, both in tone and in substance.  Not 
only is the Court’s unexplained ping-ponging between inconsistent theories of 
due process contrary to the “basic requirement” that appellate courts explain 
their decisions, but it also poses the danger that the Court will be tempted to 
use such tactics strategically to avoid losses of legitimacy, as I intimated it 
might have done above when I offered some solutions to my due process 
puzzles.  Such uses, whether or not they are strategic (and indeed, whether or 
not they are conscious at all), may well have the effect of masking the 
important moral and political choices that cannot be avoided in any 
constitutional adjudication.  This masking not only fails as explanation, it also 
has the unfortunate tendency to deflect scrutiny and criticism of constitutional 
choices because it makes those choices invisible.43  Thus, I would call not so 
much for better “judicial craft,” but rather for candor and transparency in 
constitutional interpretation.  This is the primary normative lesson I want to 
draw from Professor Israel’s work on due process.  As he has so persuasively 
demonstrated, the due process clause is implicated far and wide in the criminal 
justice system, touching on all manner of important issues from pre-trial 
restraints on liberty to the practice of capital punishment.  The Court will 
 
 39. Israel, supra note 1, at 427-30. 
 40. Id. at 429. 
 41. Id. at 430 n.719. 
 42. Id. at 432. 
 43. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 36, at 429-38 (describing “legitimation theory” and 
explaining how it operates in the context of the constitutional regulation of capital punishment). 
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continue to have to make hard constitutional choices, and only if it honestly 
and openly assesses its past choices and its current options can it include “the 
People” as part of this important discourse. 
 
